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#### ECOWAS AND FIVE DECADES OF IMPOTENCE

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## **Abstract**

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975, was envisioned as a driver of regional integration, economic development, and collective security. Yet, five decades later, the organization remains largely ineffective in fulfilling its founding aspirations. This paper interrogates the impotence of ECOWAS by critically assessing its economic, political, and security performance. Despite having a framework of treaties, protocols, and ambitious declarations, the organization has struggled with weak institutional capacity, overreliance on external actors, and the sovereignty-centered politics of member states. Methodologically, this study employs a qualitative historical analysis of ECOWAS protocols, policy documents, and secondary academic sources, supported by comparative case studies of its interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Niger. The findings suggest that ECOWAS's recurrent failures emanate from structural contradictions: while integration demands supranational authority, West African political elites remain unwilling to relinquish sovereignty. The paper concludes that unless ECOWAS undertakes radical reforms to enhance financial independence, enforcement mechanisms, and grassroots legitimacy, it risks further irrelevance in a region plagued by coups, terrorism, and economic stagnation.

Keywords; Military Coup. Democracy. Security. Economic development. Regional integration.

#### Introduction

The formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 marked an important moment in regional integration efforts across Africa. Modeled after the European Economic Community, ECOWAS aimed to promote economic cooperation, collective security, and political stability among its fifteen member states. Its founding Treaty of Lagos articulated ambitious goals such as the elimination of trade barriers, the creation of a common market, and the pursuit of regional peace and prosperity (Adebajo, 2002).

However, nearly five decades later, ECOWAS is widely perceived as an institution long on rhetoric but short on results. Despite multiple revisions of its treaty, the adoption of conflict prevention mechanisms, and the creation of protocols on democracy and governance, the organization has consistently failed to prevent coups, resolve persistent insecurity, or meaningfully advance economic integration. Repeated military interventions in member states, Mali (2020, 2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) underscore its incapacity to enforce its normative commitments.

This paper contends that ECOWAS's impotence is not accidental but structural. Its institutional weakness, dependence on Nigeria's hegemony, reliance on external funding, and members' insistence on sovereignty over supranationalism have rendered it ineffective. By exploring ECOWAS's historical trajectory and performance across economic, political, and security dimensions, this study argues that ECOWAS is ambitious in vision but incapacitated in practice.



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# Literature Review and Theoretical Framework Literature Review

Discussions on regionalism in Africa often swing between hope and doubt. On the one hand, there is optimism that regional integration can bring unity and progress. On the other hand, there is skepticism about whether this goal is realistic given Africa's unique challenges.

Early integration theories, functionalism and neo-functionalism suggested that cooperation in areas like trade and infrastructure would naturally expand into political unity (Haas, 1958). This model worked well in Europe but was harder to apply in Africa. Many African states inherited weak institutions, fragile economies, and colonial borders that made deep integration difficult (Nwokedi, 1992).

Critics, especially those influenced by dependency theory, argue that Africa's position in the global economy continues to undermine regional projects. According to Amin (1976), regional bodies are weakened by dependence on foreign donors, former colonial powers, and international financial institutions. ECOWAS reflects this problem, as it relies heavily on outside support from the European Union, France, and the United States, raising doubts about whether it truly operates independently (Ojo, 2009).

Other scholars focus on ECOWAS's internal contradictions. Olonisakin (2011) calls it a hybrid institution both a "club of presidents" that protects the interests of political elites and a platform for collective governance. This explains why its record is mixed. For example, ECOWAS gained praise for its interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s (Adebajo, 2002). However, some argue that these successes were not due to ECOWAS's institutional strength but rather Nigeria's dominance and resources at the time (Francis, 2009).

More recent studies highlight institutional weaknesses such as overlapping mandates with other regional bodies, weak enforcement mechanisms, financial dependence, and the protection of state sovereignty over regional authority (Asante, 2013; Hartmann, 2017). These issues have created a gap between the promises made in ECOWAS protocols such as commitments to democracy, free movement, and security and the slow or uneven progress seen in reality.

In short, the literature agrees that while ECOWAS has many frameworks and ambitious policies on paper, it often struggles to turn them into consistent and practical results.

#### **Theoretical Framework**

When studying ECOWAS and its journey over the past five decades, no single theory can fully explain its successes and struggles. This is why this study uses three complementary perspectives neo-functionalism, dependency theory, and hybrid institutionalism. Together, these theories help us see both the hopes behind ECOWAS and the real world barriers it faces.

## 1. Neo-functionalism

Neo-functionalism grew out of the European integration experience. The basic idea is simple: when countries start working together in practical areas like trade, transport, or energy, this cooperation will eventually "spill over" into other areas such as politics and security (Haas, 1958). Applied to ECOWAS, neo-functionalism helps us understand why West African leaders created the organization in the first place. They believed that starting with economic cooperation like removing trade barriers or enabling free movement would gradually lead to



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stronger political unity in the region. However, in practice, this "spillover effect" has been weak in West Africa. Many countries struggle with poverty, fragile institutions, and political instability, which makes it difficult for integration in one area to spread to others. Neofunctionalism is useful here because it shows the original vision and expectations of ECOWAS, but it also highlights why progress has been uneven.

## 2. Dependency Theory

While neo-functionalism looks inward at how cooperation might expand, dependency theory looks outward to the global system. Thinkers like Amin (1976) argue that African countries are often stuck in a dependent relationship with richer nations and international institutions. This dependency limits their ability to act independently. For ECOWAS, dependency theory is especially relevant. Many of its programs are funded not by member states, but by external partners such as the European Union, France, and the United States. This raises important questions: Can ECOWAS truly act in the interest of West Africans if it relies heavily on outside resources? Whose priorities does it ultimately serve, the region's or the donors'?

Dependency theory therefore helps explain one of ECOWAS's biggest dilemmas: it has ambitious goals on paper, but its financial and political reliance on external actors often undermines its autonomy.

# 3. Hybrid Institutionalism

Finally, hybrid institutionalism focuses on the inner nature of ECOWAS itself. Scholars like Olonisakin (2011) argue that ECOWAS is both a "club of presidents" an organization where political elites use it to protect their own power, and a platform for collective governance, where genuine regional cooperation can happen. This dual identity explains ECOWAS's mixed results. For example, in the 1990s, ECOWAS successfully intervened in conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. On the surface, this looked like a great institutional achievement. But in reality, these interventions were driven largely by Nigeria's leadership and resources, not by ECOWAS as a strong, independent institution.

Hybrid institutionalism helps us see why ECOWAS can sometimes act decisively, but at other times appear weak. Its effectiveness often depends on whether powerful member states, especially Nigeria, are willing to act.

Bringing It all together, these three theories give us a balanced framework for analyzing ECOWAS:

- Neo-functionalism shows the original hope that economic cooperation would spread into political unity.
- Dependency theory explains the external pressures and financial dependence that limit ECOWAS's independence.
- Hybrid institutionalism highlights the internal contradictions, showing why ECOWAS can sometimes succeed but often struggles.

#### Methodology

This study adopts a qualitative approach, as its goal is to understand why ECOWAS has struggled to achieve its objectives, rather than to measure outcomes using numerical data. A qualitative design allows for close examination of historical events, institutional choices, and political decisions that have shaped the organization. The study draws on ideas from historical institutionalism and comparative regionalism, which are useful for looking at how institutions evolve over time and how they compare with one another.



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The research uses both primary and secondary sources.

- Primary sources include ECOWAS treaties, charters, communiqués, and official reports. These documents are analyzed to see what the organization has promised, how it frames its role, and how its priorities have shifted over time.
- Secondary sources include scholarly articles, academic books, and policy reports. These provide background context, theoretical insights, and critical evaluations of ECOWAS's performance.

Using both types of sources helps ensure a balanced understanding that is not limited to what ECOWAS itself claims in its official documents.

The study looks closely at four country cases: Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Niger. These were chosen because they represent important moments in ECOWAS's history.

- Liberia and Sierra Leone highlight ECOWAS's early peacekeeping interventions in the 1990s.
- Mali and Niger show how ECOWAS has dealt with more recent crises, such as coups and terrorism.

Together, these cases provide a way to see how ECOWAS has responded across different times and contexts, and whether its methods and effectiveness have changed.

The analysis focuses on three main areas of ECOWAS's work: economic integration, political governance, and security interventions. A method called process tracing is used to follow the sequence of events in each case, showing how decisions were made and what outcomes followed. A political economy perspective is also applied, which means paying attention to how the interests of political leaders, sovereignty concerns, and reliance on outside donors influence ECOWAS's actions.

To strengthen the credibility of the study, information from different sources is compared and cross-checked. For example, official ECOWAS statements are weighed against independent reports and academic analyses. Looking at multiple perspectives helps avoid relying on one-sided narratives and improves the reliability of findings.

This study takes a critical but balanced perspective. ECOWAS is not treated simply as a neutral organization, it is seen as an institution shaped by power struggles, competing interests, and political realities. By keeping this in mind, the research aims to capture both the strengths and weaknesses of the organization in a fair way.

## **ECOWAS Historical Perspective**

# Founding and Economic Aspirations (1975–1990)

The 1975 Treaty of Lagos envisioned ECOWAS as an economic bloc that would eliminate tariffs, establish a customs union, and eventually create a monetary union. Yet, intra-regional trade has stagnated at approximately 10–12% of total trade, compared to over 60% in the European Union (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2020). Protectionism, poor infrastructure, and overlapping memberships in other regional blocs (e.g., UEMOA) undermined progress.

## **Security Phase (1990s–2000s)**

With the outbreak of civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS shifted toward security. The creation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) marked Africa's first sub-



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regional military intervention. While ECOMOG eventually restored relative stability, it was heavily dependent on Nigeria's political will and resources (Adebajo, 2002). This dependence exposed the fragility of collective security.

## **Democratic Norms and Protocols (2001–2010s)**

The 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance prohibited unconstitutional changes of government and committed ECOWAS to sanction coups. Yet, in practice, the region has experienced at least eight successful coups since 2000. ECOWAS has alternated between imposing sanctions and negotiating with juntas, often failing to restore democratic order.

# **Contemporary Crises (2010s–2020s)**

Terrorism in the Sahel, coupled with recurrent coups, has eroded ECOWAS's credibility. The suspension of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in recent years, and their subsequent threat to withdraw from ECOWAS, highlight its diminishing legitimacy among citizens and governments alike.

## **Analysis: Five Decades of Impotence**

- 1. Economic Failures
  - Trade stagnation: Despite multiple protocols, intra-ECOWAS trade remains minimal.
  - Currency union delays: The proposed "Eco" currency has been repeatedly postponed, undermining monetary integration.
  - Fragmentation: Francophone and Anglophone divides, alongside overlapping memberships, hinder progress.
- 2. Security Failures
  - ECOWAS peacekeeping has been ad hoc, reactive, and unsustainable.
  - Counterterrorism in the Sahel remains primarily led by external actors (France's Operation Barkhane, MINUSMA, now departed, and Russian mercenaries).
  - The inability to prevent jihadist expansion underscores institutional weakness.
- 3. Democracy and Governance Failures
  - ECOWAS's 2001 Protocol has proven unenforceable.
  - Coups in Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger show juntas disregard sanctions without losing domestic legitimacy.
  - Double standards undermine credibility; authoritarian regimes are tolerated if leaders are allies.
- 4. Institutional Weaknesses
  - ECOWAS institutions are underfunded and donor-dependent. Over 60% of its budget comes from external sources (Ojo, 2009).
  - Decision-making is elite-driven; civil society is marginalized.
  - Supranational enforcement is absent; sovereignty remains important to give up.

## **Findings**

From the review of literature and theories, several key insights emerge about ECOWAS:

- 1. High Ambition, Low Implementation: ECOWAS has created many protocols and policies on democracy, security, and free movement. However, these often remain more on paper than in practice. There is a gap between what is promised and what is delivered
- 2. Dependence on External Support: A large share of ECOWAS's funding and resources comes from donors such as the EU, France, and the United States. This makes the



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organization vulnerable to outside influence and raises concerns about its independence.

- 3. Internal Contradictions: ECOWAS operates both as a genuine platform for regional cooperation and as a "club of presidents" protecting elite interests. This dual character explains why the organization is sometimes effective (e.g., peacekeeping missions) but at other times slow or inactive.
- 4. Dominance of Powerful States: In practice, ECOWAS's most significant actions often depend on the leadership and resources of stronger states like Nigeria, rather than on strong regional institutions.
- 5. Institutional Weaknesses: Overlapping regional bodies, weak enforcement mechanisms, financial limits, and prioritization of state sovereignty continue to hold back deeper integration.

#### Conclusion

After more than five decades, ECOWAS remains caught between vision and reality. On one hand, it has established an impressive framework of policies and protocols aimed at peace, integration, and democracy. On the other hand, its actual performance has been inconsistent. The study shows that both external factors (such as dependency on donors) and internal dynamics (elite-driven decision-making and weak institutions) shape ECOWAS's outcomes. While ECOWAS had moments of success such as its interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the gap between ambition and implementation remains the central challenge for the organization's future.

## Recommendations

Based on the findings, the following recommendations are proposed:

- 1. Strengthen Implementation Mechanisms:
  - ECOWAS should move beyond drafting protocols and focus on enforcing them. This may include stronger monitoring systems, regular progress reviews, and penalties for states that fail to comply with agreed commitments.
  - 2. Reduce over-reliance on external donors:
    - Member states should increase their financial contributions and explore regional funding models, such as levies on trade within West Africa. Greater financial independence would give ECOWAS more autonomy in decision-making.
  - 3. Balance Elite Interests with Regional Needs:
    - ECOWAS should create stronger channels for civil society, private sector actors, and community organizations to participate in its decision-making. This would make policies more people-centered and reduce the dominance of political elites.
  - 4. Build Institutional Capacity Instead of Relying on Individual States: While Nigeria's leadership has been crucial, ECOWAS must build stronger collective
    - institutions so that its success does not depend on a single country. This includes strengthening the ECOWAS Commission and giving it more authority and resources.
  - 5. Streamline and Clarify Regional Mandates:
    - ECOWAS should coordinate better with other African regional organizations to reduce overlaps and duplication. Clearer division of responsibilities would make the organization more efficient and effective.



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